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Abstract
Training Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) that are robust to norm bounded adver-
sarial attacks remains an elusive problem. While verification based methods are
generally too expensive to robustly train large networks, it was demonstrated in
[1] that bounded input intervals can be inexpensively propagated per layer through
large networks. This interval bound propagation (IBP) approach led to high ro-
bustness and was the first to be employed on large networks. However, due to the
very loose nature of the IBP bounds, particularly for large networks, the required
training procedure is complex and involved. In this paper, we closely examine
the bounds of a block of layers composed of an affine layer followed by a ReLU
nonlinearity followed by another affine layer. In doing so, we propose probabilistic
bounds, true bounds in expectation, that are provably tighter than IBP bounds in
expectation. We then extend this result to deeper networks through blockwise
propagation and show that we can achieve orders of magnitudes tighter bounds
compared to IBP. With such tight bounds, we demonstrate that a simple standard
training procedure can achieve the best robustness-accuracy trade-off across several
architectures on both MNIST and CIFAR102.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have demonstrated impressive performance in many fields of research with
applications ranging from image classification [2, 3] and semantic segmentation [4] to speech
recognition [5], just to name a few. Despite this success, DNNs are still susceptible to small
imperceptible perturbations, which can lead to drastic degradation in performance, particularly
in visual classification tasks. Such perturbations are best known and commonly referred to as
adversarial attacks. Early work showed that with simple algorithms (e.g. maximize the classification
loss with respect to the input using a single optimization iteration [6]), one can easily construct such
adversaries. Since then, a research surge has emerged to develop simple routines to consistently
construct adversarial examples. For instance, [7] proposed a simple algorithm, called DeepFool,
which finds the smallest perturbation that fools a linearized version of the network. Interestingly, the
work of [8] demonstrated that such adversaries can be both network and input agnostic, i.e. there
exists universal deterministic samples that fool a wide range of DNNs across a large number of input
samples. More recently, it was shown that such adversaries can be as simple as Gaussian noise [9].
Knowing that DNNs are easily susceptible to simple attacks can hinder the public confidence in them
especially for real-world deployment, e.g. in self-driving cars and devices for the visually impaired.
Such a performance nuisance has prompted several active research directions, in particular, work
towards network defense and verification. Network defense aims to train networks that are robust
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against adversarial attacks through means of robust training or procedures at inference time that
dampen the effectiveness of the attack [10, 11, 12, 13]. On the other hand, verification aims to
certify/verify for a given DNN that there exists no small perturbations of a given input that can change
its output prediction [14, 15, 16]. However, there are also works at the intersection of both often
referred to as robustness verification methods, which use verification methods to train robust networks.
Such algorithms often try to minimize the exact, or an upper bound, of the worst adversarial loss over
all possible bounded energy (often measured in `∞ norm) perturbation around a given input.
Although verification methods proved to be effective in training robust networks [11], they are very
computationally expensive, thus limiting their applicability to only small, at best medium, sized
networks. However, Gowal et. al. [1] recently demonstrated that training large networks robustly is
possible by leveraging the cheap-to-compute but very loose interval based verifier, known as interval
domain from [17]. In particular, they propagate the -`∞ norm bounded input centered at x ∈ Rn,
i.e. [x− 1n,x+ 1n], through every layer in the network at a time. This interval bound propagation
(IBP) is inexpensive and simple; however, it results in very loose output interval bounds, which in
turn requires a complex and involved training procedure.
In this paper, we are interested in improving the tightness of the output interval bounds (referred to as
bounds from now on). We do so by examining more closely the bounds for a block of layers that
is composed of an affine layer followed by a ReLU nonlinearity followed by another affine layer
under -`∞ bounded input. In doing so, we propose new probabilistic bounds for this block of layers,
which we prove to be not only supersets to the true bounds of this block in expectation, but also
very tight to the true bounds. Then, we show how to leverage such a result and extend it to deeper
networks through blockwise bound propagation leading to several orders of magnitude tighter bounds
as compared to IBP [1].
Contributions. Our contributions are three-fold. (i) We propose new bounds for the block of layers
that is composed of an affine layer followed by a ReLU nonlinearity followed by another affine layer.
We prove that these bounds are probabilistically true bounds in the sense that they are, in expectation,
a super set to the true bounds of this block. Moreover, we prove that these bounds are much tighter
than the IBP bounds [1] obtained by propagating the input bounds through every layer in the block.
Our bounds get even tighter as the number of hidden nodes in the first affine layer increase. (ii) We
show a practical and efficient approach to propagate our bounds (for the block of layers) through
blocks, not through individual layers, of a deep network, thus resulting in magnitudes tighter output
bounds compared to IBP. (iii) Lastly, we conduct synthetic experiments to verify the theory as well
as the factors of improvement over propagating the bounds layerwise. Moreover, and due to our
tight bounds, we show that with a simple standard training procedure, one can robustly train large
networks on both MNIST [18] and CIFAR10 [19] achieving state-of-art robustness-accuracy trade-off
compared to IBP [1]. In other words, with standard training and because of our tight bounds, we can
consistently improve robustness by significant margins with very minimal effect on test accuracy as
compared to IBP [1].
2 Related Work
Training accurate and robust DNNs remains an elusive problem, since several works have demon-
strated that small imperceptible perturbations (adversarial attacks) to the DNN input can drastically
affect their performance. Early works showed that with a very simple algorithm, as simple as max-
imizing the loss with respect to the input for a single iteration [6], one can easily construct such
adversaries. This has strengthened the line of work towards network verification for both evaluating
network robustness and for robust network training. In general, verification approaches can be
coarsely categorized as exact or relaxed verifiers.
Exact Verification. Verifiers of this type try to find the exact largest adversarial loss over all possible
bounded energy (usually in the `∞ norm sense) perturbations around a given input. They are often
tailored for piecewise linear networks, e.g. networks with ReLU and LeakyReLU nonlinearities.
They typically require solving a mixed integer problem [20, 21, 22] or Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solvers [23, 24]. The main advantage of these approaches is that they can reason about
exact adversarial robustness; however, they generally are computationally intractable for verification
purposes let alone any sort of robust network training. The largest network used for verification with
such verifiers was with the work of [22], which employed a mixed integer solver applied to networks
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of at most 3 hidden layers. The verification is fast for such networks that are pretrained with a relaxed
verifier as the method gets much slower on networks that are similar in size but normally trained.
Relaxed Verification. Verifiers of this type aim to find an upper bound on the worst adversarial loss
across a range of bounded inputs. For instance, a general framework called CROWN was proposed
in [25] to certify robustness by bounding the activation with linear and quadratic functions which
enables the study of generic, not necessarily piece-wise linear, activation functions. By utilizing
the structure in ReLU based networks, the work of [16] proposed two fast algorithms based on
linear approximation on the ReLU units. Moreover, Wang et al. [26] proposed ReluVal for network
verification based on symbolic interval bounds where [27] proposed Neurify with a much tighter
bounds. Several other works utilize the dual view of the verification problem [11, 28]. More recently,
the method of [29] unified a large number of recent works in a single convex relaxation framework
and revealed several relationships between them. In particular, it was shown that convex relaxation
based methods that fit this framework suffer from an inherit barrier once compared to exact verifiers.
For completeness, it is important to note that there are also hybrid methods that combine both exact
and relaxed verifiers and have shown to be effective [30].
Although relaxed verifiers are much more computationally friendly than exact verifiers, they are
still too expensive for robust training of large networks (networks with more than 5 hidden layers).
However, very loose relaxed verifiers possibly can still be exploited for this purpose. For instance,
Wang et. al. [31] leverage symbolic interval analysis to verifiably train large network. More recently,
the work of [1] proposed to use the extremely inexpensive but very loose interval bound propagation
(IBP) certificate to train, for the first time, large robust networks with state-of-the-art robustness
performance. This was at the expense of a complex and involved training routine due to the loose
nature of the bounds. To remedy the training difficulties, we propose probabilistic bounds, not for
each layer individually, but for a block of layers jointly. Such bounds are slightly more expensive
to compute but are much tighter. We then propagate the bounds through every block in a deeper
network to attain overall much tighter bounds compared to layerwise IBP. The tighter bounds allow
for simple standard training routines to be employed for robust training of large networks resulting in
state-of-art robustness-accuracy trade-off.
3 Probabilistically True and Tight Interval Bounds
We analyze the interval bounds of a DNN by proposing probabilistically true and tight bounds for
a two-layer network (Affine-ReLU-Affine) and then we propose a mechanism to extend them for
deeper networks. But first, we detail the interval bounds of [1] to put our proposed bounds in context.
3.1 Interval Bounds for a Single Affine Layer
For a single affine layer parameterized by A1 ∈ Rk×n and b1 ∈ Rk, it is easy to show that its output
lower and upper interval bounds for an -`∞ norm bounded input x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n] are:
l1 = A1x+ b1 − |A1|1n, u1 = A1x+ b1 + |A1|1n. (1)
Note that |.| is an elementwise absolute operator. In the presence of any non-decreasing elementwise
nonlinearity (e.g. ReLU), the bounds can then be propagated by applying the nonlinearity to [l1,u1]
directly. As such, the interval bounds can be propagated through the network one layer at a time,
as in [1]. While this interval bound propagation (IBP) mechanism is a very simple and inexpensive
approach to compute bounds, they can be extremely loose for deep networks resulting in a complex
and involved robust network training procedure [1].
3.2 Proposed Interval Bounds for an Affine-ReLU-Affine Block
Here, we consider a block of layers of the form Affine-ReLU-Affine in the presence of `∞ perturba-
tions at the input. The functional form of this network is g(x) = a>2 max (A1x+ b1,0) +b2, where
max(.) is an elementwise operator. The affine mappings can be of any size, and throughout the paper,
A1 ∈ Rk×n and without loss of generality the second affine map is a single vector a2 ∈ Rk. Note
that g also includes convolutional layers, since they are also affine mappings.
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Layerwise Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) on g. Here, we apply the layerwise propagation
strategy of [1] detailed in Section 3.1 on function g(x˜) with x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n] to obtain bounds
[LIBP,UIBP]. We use these bounds for comparison in what follows.
LIBP = a
>
2
(
max (u1,0k) + max (l1,0k)
2
)
− |a>2 |
(
max (u1,0k)−max (l1,0k)
2
)
+ b2,
UIBP = a
>
2
(
max (u1,0k) + max (l1,0k)
2
)
+ |a>2 |
(
max (u1,0k)−max (l1,0k)
2
)
+ b2.
Note that max (l1,0k) and max (u1,0k) are the result of propagating [x− 1n,x + 1n] through
the first affine map (A1,b1) and then the ReLU nonlinearity, as shown in (1).
Probabilistically True and Tight Interval Bounds on g. Our goal is to propose new interval
bounds on g, as a whole, which are tighter than the IBP bounds [LIBP,UIBP], since we believe that
such tighter bounds for a two-layer block, when propagated/extended to deeper networks, can be
tighter than applying IBP layerwise. Denoting the true output interval bounds of g as [Ltrue,Utrue], the
following inequality holds Ltrue ≤ g(x˜) ≤ Utrue ∀x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n]. Deriving these true (and
tight) bounds for g in closed form is either hard or results in bounds that are generally very difficult
to compute, deeming them impractical for applications such as robust network training. Instead,
we propose new closed form expressions for the interval bounds denoted as [LM,UM], which we
prove to be probablistically true bounds, i.e. true in expectation, and tighter than [LIBP,UIBP] in
expectation. As such, we make two main theoretical findings. (i) We prove that LM < g(x˜) < UM
holds in expectation, i.e. LM ≤ Ltrue and UM ≥ Utrue hold in expectation when the input dimension
n is large enough (probabilistically true bounds). (ii) We prove that [LM,UM] can be arbitrarily
tighter than the loose bounds [LIBP,UIBP] in expectation, as the number of hidden nodes k increases
(probabilistically tighter bounds).
Analysis. To derive LM and UM, we study the bounds of the following function instead
g˜(x˜) = a>2 M (A1x˜+ b1) + b2 = a
>
2 MA1x˜+ a
>
2 Mb1 + b2. (2)
Note that g˜ is very similar to the Affine-ReLU-Affine map captured by g with the ReLU replaced by
a diagonal matrix M constructed as follows. If we denote u1 = A1x+ b1 + |A1|1n as the upper
bound resulting from the propagation of the input bounds [x− 1n,x+ 1n] through the first affine
map (A1,b1), then we have M = diag (1 {u1 ≥ 0k}) where 1 is an indicator function. In other
words, Mii = 1 when the ith element of u1 is non-negative and zero otherwise. Note that for a given
u1, g˜(x˜) is an affine function with the following output interval bounds when x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n]:
LM = a
>
2 MA1x+ a
>
2 Mb1 + b2 − |a>2 MA1|1n (3)
UM = a
>
2 MA1x+ a
>
2 Mb1 + b2 + |a>2 MA1|1n (4)
Theorem 1. (Probabilistically True Bounds in Expectation) Consider an `∞ bounded uniform
random variable input x˜, i.e. x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n], to a block of layers in the form of Affine-ReLU-
Affine (parameterized by A1,b1,a2 and b2 for the first and second affine layers, respectively). With
the true output interval bounds being [Ltrue,Utrue], i.e. Ltrue ≤ g(x˜) ≤ Utrue ∀x˜, the following
holds with an overwhelming probability for a sufficiently large m:
Ltrue ≥ Lapprox = Ey˜
[
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
]−m√Vary˜ ([a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2))),
Utrue ≤ Uapprox = Ey˜
[
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
]
+m
√
Vary˜
([
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
))
,
where y˜ = A1x˜ + b1 ∼ N
(
A1x+ b1,
2
3 A1A
>
1
)
by Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem 3. For
random matrices A1 and a2 with i.i.d Gaussian elements of zero mean and σA1 and σa2 standard
deviations, and for a sufficiently large input dimension n and m, we have:
EA1,a2 [LM] ≤ EA1,a2 [Lapprox] ≤ EA1,a2 [Ltrue] ,
EA1,a2 [Utrue] ≤ EA1,a2 [Uapprox] ≤ EA1,a2 [UM] .
(5)
3See the supplementary material for the proof of the Lyapunov condition.
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Theorem 1 states that the interval bounds to function g˜ are simply looser bounds to the function
of interest g in expectation, under a plausible distribution of A1 and a2. Now, we investigate the
tightness of these bounds as compared to the IBP bounds [LIBP,UIBP].
Theorem 2. (Probabilistically Tighter Bounds in Expectation) Consider an `∞ bounded uni-
form random variable input x˜, i.e. x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n], to a block of layers in the form of
Affine-ReLU-Affine (parameterized by A1,b1,a2 and b2 for the first and second affine layers re-
spectively) and a2 ∼ N (0, σa2I). Under the assumption that 1√2pixj1>kA1(:, j) + 12n1>k b1 ≥

(
‖A1(:, j)‖2 − 1√2pi‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
∀j, we have: Ea2 [(UIBP − LIBP)− (UM − LM)] ≥ 0.
Theorem 2 states that under some assumptions on A1 and under a plausible distribution for a2, our
proposed interval width can be much smaller than the IBP interval width, i.e. our proposed intervals
are much tighter than the IBP intervals.
Next, we show that the inequality assumption in Theorem 2 is very mild. In fact, a wide range of
(A1,b1) satisfy it and the following proposition gives an example that does so in expectation.
Proposition 1. For a random matrix A1 ∈ Rk×n with i.i.d elements A1(i, j) ∼ N (0, 1), then
EA1
(
‖A1(:, j)‖2 − 1√
2pi
‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
=
√
2
Γ
(
k+1
2
)
Γ
(
k
2
) − k√ 2
pi
≈
√
k
(
1−
√
2
pi
√
k
)
.
Proposition 1 implies that as the number of hidden nodes k increases, the expectation of the right
hand side of the inequality assumption in Theorem 2 grows more negative, while the left hand side of
the inequality is zero in expectation when b1 ∼ N (0k, I). In other words, for Gaussian zero-mean
weights (A1,b1) and with a large enough number of hidden nodes k, the assumption is satisfied. All
proofs and detailed analyses are provided in the supplementary material.
3.3 Extending our Probabilistically True and Tight Bounds to Deeper Networks
To extend our proposed bounds to networks deeper than a two-layer block, we simply apply our
bound procedure described in Section 3.2, recursively for every block. In particular, consider an
L-layer neural network defined as f(x) = ALReLU(AL−1ReLU(· · ·A2ReLU(A1x))) and an -
`∞ norm bounded input centered at x, i.e. x˜ ∈ [x − 1n,x + 1n]. Without loss of generality,
we assume f is bias-free for ease of notation. Then, the output lower and upper bounds of f are
LM = GL−1x − |GL−1|1n and UM = GL−1x + |GL−1|1n, respectively. Here, GL−1 is a
linear map that can be obtained recursively as follows:
Gi = Ai+1MiGi−1, where G0 = A1,
Mi = diag (1 {(Gi−1x+ |Gi−1|1n) ≥ 0})
Note that Gi−1x + |Gi−1|1n is the output upper bound through a linear layer parameterized by
Gi−1 for input x˜ as in (1). With this blockwise propagation, the output interval bounds of f are now
estimated by the output intervals of f˜(x˜) = GL−1x˜.
4 Experiments
Probabilistically True Bounds. In this experiment, we validate Theorem 1 with several controlled
experiments. For a network of the form g(x˜) = A2 max (A1x˜+ b1,0) + b2 that has true bounds
[Ltrue,Utrue] for x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n], we empirically show that our proposed bounds [LM,UM],
under the mild assumptions of Theorem 1, indeed are true with a high probability, i.e. LM ≤
g(x˜) ≤ UM. Moreover, we verify that the larger the network input dimension n is, the inequality
LM ≤ g(x˜) ≤ UM holds with even higher probability (as predicted by Theorem 1).
We start by constructing a network g where the biases b1 ∈ Rk and b2 ∈ R1 are initialized following
the default Pytorch [32] initialization. As for the elements of the weight matrices A1 ∈ Rk×n and
A2 ∈ R1×k, they are sampled from N (0, 1/
√
n) and N (0, 1/√k), respectively. We estimate, Ltrue
and Utrue by taking the minimum and maximum of 106 + 2n Monte-Carlo evaluations of g. For
a given x ∼ N (0n, I) and with  = 0.1, we uniformly sample 106 examples from the interval
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Probabilistically True Bounds. We show that our proposed interval bounds [LM,UM]
are a super set of the true interval bounds [Ltrue,Utrue] with high probability. Figure 1a shows how
close the two intervals are for a two layer neural network (as predicted by Theorem 1), while Figure
1b shows how close they are for networks of varying depth.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Tighter than IBP with Varying Input Size and Hidden Nodes. We show a bound
tightness comparison between our proposed interval bounds and those of IBP [1] by comparing the
difference and ratio of their interval lengths with varying k, n and  for a two-layer network. The
proposed bounds are significantly tighter than IBP (as predicted by Theorem 2).
[x − 1n,x + 1n]. We also sample all 2n corners of the hyper cube {x − 1n,x + 1n}n. To
probabilistically show that the proposed interval [LM,UM] is a super set of [Ltrue,Utrue] (i.e. they
are true bounds), we evaluate the length of the intersection of the two intervals over the length of the
true interval defined as Γ = |[LM,UM] ∩ [Ltrue,Utrue]|/|[Ltrue,Utrue]|. Note that Γ = 1 if and only
if [LM,UM] is a super set of [Ltrue,Utrue]. For a given n, we conduct this experiment 103 times with
a varying A1, A2, b1, b2 and x and report the average Γ. Then, we run this for a varying number
of input size n and a varying number of hidden nodes k, as reported in Figure 1a. As predicted by
Theorem 1, Figure 1a demonstrates that as n increases, the proposed interval will be a super set
of the true interval, with a higher probability, regardless of the number of hidden nodes k. Note
that networks that are as wide as k = 1000, require no more than n = 15 input dimensions for
the proposed intervals to be a superset of the true intervals. In practice, n is much larger than that,
e.g. n ≈ 3× 103 in CIFAR10.
In Figure 1b, we empirically show that the above behavior also holds for deeper networks. We
propagate the bounds blockwise as discussed in Section 3.3 and conduct similar experiments on
fully-connected networks. We construct networks with varying depth, where each layer has the same
number of nodes equal to the input dimension k = n.
These results indeed suggest that the proposed bounds are true bounds with high probability and
this probability increases with larger input dimensions. Here, n = 20 is better than n = 10 across
different network depths. The same behaviour holds for convolutional networks as well.
Probabilistically Tight Bounds. We experimentally affirm that our bounds can be much tighter
than IBP bounds [1]. In particular, we validate Theorem 2 by comparing interval lengths of our
proposed bounds, WM = UM − LM, to those from IBP, WIBP = UIBP − LIBP, on networks
with functional form g. We compute both the difference and ratio of widths for varying values of k,
n, and . Figure 2 reports the average width difference and ratio over 103 runs in a similar setup to
the previous section. Figures 2a and 2b show that the proposed bounds indeed get tighter than IBP,
as k increases across all  values (as predicted by Theorem 2). Note that we show tightness results
for  = {0.01, 0.1} in Figure 2b as the performance of  = {0.5, 1.0} were very similar to  = 0.1.
Moreover, the improvement is consistently present when varying n as shown in Figures 2c and 2d.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Tighter than IBP in Deeper Networks. We show a bound tightness comparison between
our proposed interval bounds and those of IBP [1] by varying the number of layers for several choices
of . The proposed bounds are significantly tighter than IBP.
Figure 4: Qualitative Results. We plot visualizations of the output polytope of a 20-100-100-100-
100-2 network through Monte-Carlo evaluations of the network with a uniform random input with
varying . We also plot our proposed bounds [LM,UM] in red. Each row is for a given  with different
randomized weights for the network. As for the IBP bounds [LIBP,UIBP], they were omitted as
they were significantly larger. For example, for the first figure with  = 0.05, the IBP bounds were
[−43.67, 32.86] for the x-axis and [−47.79, 36.98] for the y-axis.
We also compare the tightness of our bounds to those of IBP with increasing depth for both fully-
connected networks (refer to Figures 3a and 3b) and convolutional networks (refer to Figures 3c and
3d). For all fully-connected networks, we take n = k = 500. Our proposed bounds get consistently
tighter as the network depth increases over all choices of . In particular, the proposed bounds can be
more than 106 times tighter than IBP for a 10 layer DNN. A similar observation can also be made for
convolutional networks. For convolutional networks, it is expensive to compute our bounds using the
procedure described in Section 3.3, so instead we obtain matrices Mi using the easy-to-compute IBP
upper bounds. Despite this relaxation, we still obtain very tight and probabilistically true bounds.
Note that this slightly modified approach reduces exactly to our bounds for two-layer networks.
Qualitative Results. Following previous work [11, 1], Figure 4 visualizes some examples of the
proposed bounds and compares them to the true ones for several choices of  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25} and
a random five-layer fully-connected network with architecture n-100-100-100-100-2. We also show
the results of the Monte-Carlo sampling for an input size n = 20. More qualitative visualizations for
different values of n are in the supplementary material.
Training Robust Networks. In this section, we conduct experiments showing that our proposed
bounds can be used to robustly train DNNs. We compare our method against models trained nominally
(i.e. only the nominal training loss is used), and those trained robustly with IBP [1]. Given the well-
known robustness-accuracy trade off, robust models are often less accurate. Therefore, we compare
all methods using an accuracy vs. robustness scatter plot. Following prior art, we use Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [10] to measure robustness. We use a loss function similar to the one
proposed in [1]. In particular, we use L = `(fθ(x),ytrue) + κ`(z,ytrue), where `, fθ(x), ytrue, and
κ are the cross-entropy loss, output logits, the true class label and regularization hyperparameter
respectively. z represents the “adversarial" logits obtained by combining the lower bound of the true
class label and the upper bound of all other labels, as in [1]. When κ = 0, nominal training is invoked.
Due to the tightness of our bounds and in contrast to IBP [1], we follow a standard training procedure
that avoids the need to vary κ or train during training [1].
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Figure 5: Better Test Accuracy and Robustness on MNIST. We compare the PGD robustness and
test accuracy of three models (small, medium, and large) robustly trained on the MNIST dataset using
our bounds and those robustly trained with IBP. We have trained both methods using four different
train but we eliminated all models test accuracy lower than 97.5%. Our results demonstrate a good
trade-off between accuracy and robustness and, in some cases (medium and large), we excel in both.
Figure 6: Better Test Accuracy and Robustness on CIFAR10. Compares the PGD robustness and
test accuracy of three models (small, medium, and large) robustly trained on the CIFAR10 dataset
using our bounds and those robustly trained with IBP. We eliminated all models with test accuracy
lower than 40.0%. PGD robustness is averaged over multiple test (refer to supplementary material).
Experimental Setup. We train the three network models (small, medium and large) provided by [1]
on both MNIST and CIFAR10. See supplementary material for more details. Following the setup
in [1], we train all models with train ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and train ∈ {2/255, 8/255, 16/255, 0.1}
on MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively. Then, we compute the PGD robustness for every train
of every model architecture for all test ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} for MNIST and for all test ∈
{2/255, 8/255, 16/255, 0.1} for CIFAR10. To compare training methods, we compute the av-
erage PGD robustness over all test, the test accuracy, and report them in a 2D scatter plot. In all
experiments, we grid search over {0.1, 0.001, 0.0001} learning rates and employ a temperature over
the logits with a grid of {1, 1/5} as in [33].
We report the performance results on MNIST for the small, medium and large architectures in Figure
5. For all trained architectures, we only report the results for models that achieve at least a test
accuracy of 97.5%; otherwise, it is an indication of failure in training. Interestingly, our training
scheme can be used to train all architectures for all train. This is unlike IBP, which for example
was only able to successfully train the large architecture with train = 0.1. Moreover, the models
trained with our bounds always achieve better PGD robustness than the nominally trained networks
on all architectures (small, medium and large) while preserving similar if not a higher accuracy
(large architecture). While the models trained with IBP achieve high robustness, their test accuracy
is drastically affected. Note that over all architectures and for some train, training with our bounds
always yields models with comparable or better PGD robustness but with a much higher test accuracy.
Similar observations can be made when training on CIFAR10 as shown in Figure 6. We only report
the performance of trained architectures that achieve at least a test accuracy of 40%. All our trained
models successfully train over all architectures and over all train. They always achieve better PGD
robustness, while maintaining similar or better test accuracy. Interestingly, all the models trained
using IBP [1] achieve a much lower test accuracy.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed new interval bounds that are very tight, relatively cheap to compute,
and probabilistically true. We analytically showed that for the block (Affine-ReLU-Affine) with
large input and hidden layer sizes, our bounds are true in expectation and can be several orders
of magnitude tighter than the bound obtained with IBP. We then proposed an approach to extend
8
these results to deeper networks through means of blockwise propagation. We conduct extensive
experiments verifying our theory on the Affine-ReLU-Affine block, and demonstrating that the same
behaviour persist for deeper networks. As a result, we are able to train large models, with standard
typical simple training routines while achieving excellent trade-off between accuracy and robustness.
Acknowledgments. This work was supported by the King Abdullah University of Science and
Technology (KAUST) Office of Sponsored Research.
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A Probabilistically True Bounds in Expectation
Proposition 1. For the random vector a ∼ N (0, σaI) and the uniform random vector x ∼ U [v −
1n,x+ 1n] where both a and x are independent, we have that Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem
holds such that
1
sn
n∑
i=1
(xiai − E[aixi])→d N (0, 1), where s2n = Var
(
n∑
i=1
(xiai − E[aixi])
)
where→d indicates convergence in distribution.
Proof. The Lyapunov condition
∃δ > 0, 1
s2+δn
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣xiai − E[aixi]∣∣2+δ]→ 0, as n→∞ (6)
is a sufficient for Lyanunov Central Limit Theorem to hold. Note that
s2n =
2∑
i=1
Var (xiai) =
n∑
i=1
E
[
a2ix
2
i
]
= σ2a
n∑
i=1
(
2
3
+ v2i
)
= σ2a
(
n2
3
+
n∑
i=1
v2i
)
. (7)
Since for δ = 2, we have that
E[|aixi|2+δ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ vi+
vi−
a2ix
2
i
1
2
1√
2piσa
exp
(
− a
2
i
2σ2a
)
daidxi
=
3σ4a
2
∫ vi+
vi−
x4i dxi =
3σ4a
10
[
(vi + )
5 − (vi − )5
]
.
Thereafter, Lyanunov Central Limit Theorem with δ = 2 is satisfied since
lim
n→∞
1
s4n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣xiai − E[aixi]∣∣2+δ] = lim
n→∞
1
s4n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣xiai∣∣4]
= lim
n→∞
3
∑n
i=1 ((vi + )
5 − (vi − )5
10
(
n2
3 +
∑n
i=1 v
2
i
)2
≤ lim
n→∞
3n
(
(vmax + )
5 − (vmin − )5
)
10
(
n2
3 +
∑n
i=1 v
2
i
)2 = 0
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Theorem 1. (Probabilistically True Bounds in Expectation) Consider an `∞ bounded uniform
random variable input x˜, i.e. x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n], to a block of layers in the form of Affine-ReLU-
Affine (parameterized by A1,b1,a2 and b2 for the first and second affine layers, respectively). With
the true output interval bounds being [Ltrue,Utrue], i.e. Ltrue ≤ g(x˜) ≤ Utrue ∀x˜, the following
holds with an overwhelming probability for a sufficiently large m:
Ltrue ≥ Lapprox = Ey˜
[
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
]−m√Vary˜ ([a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2))),
Utrue ≤ Uapprox = Ey˜
[
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
]
+m
√
Vary˜
([
a>2 (max (y˜,0k) + b2)
))
,
where y˜ = A1x˜ + b1 ∼ N
(
A1x+ b1,
2
3 A1A
>
1
)
by Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem 4. For
random matrices A1 and a2 with i.i.d Gaussian elements of zero mean and σA1 and σa2 standard
deviations, and for a sufficiently large input dimension n and m, we have:
EA1,a2 [LM] ≤ EA1,a2 [Lapprox] ≤ EA1,a2 [Ltrue] ,
EA1,a2 [Utrue] ≤ EA1,a2 [Uapprox] ≤ EA1,a2 [UM] .
(8)
Proof. Since x˜ is uniformly distributed between [x− 1,x+ 1] with mean µx˜ = x and covariance
matrix Σx˜ = (2/3)I. The output of the first linear layer y˜ = A1x˜+ b1 has mean µy˜ = A1x+ b1
and covariance matrix Σy˜ = (2/3)A1AT1 . Assuming Lyapunov CLT holds then y˜ can thus be
approximated as N (A1x+ b1, (2/3)A1AT1 ) for relatively large n. Following the recent analytic
expressions derived for the first and output moments of a network of the form of Affine layer followed
by a ReLU followed by another Affine in [9], Then the mean is given as follows:
Ey˜
[
a>2 (max (y˜,0) + b2)
]
= a>2 [µy˜  Φ(µy˜  σy˜) + σy˜  φ(µy˜  σy˜)] + b2.
Note that Φ and φ are the normal cumulative and probability Gaussian density functions and
where σy˜ =
√
diag (Σy˜) = (/
√
3)
√
diag
(
A1A>1
)
where diag extracts the diagonal elements
of a matrix to a vector and that  is an elemenwise division. Moreover, note that σy˜σ>y˜ =
(2/3)
√
diag (A1A1)
√
diag (A1A1)
>
= (2/3)Ψ where Ψi,j = ‖A1(i, :)‖2‖A1(j, :)‖2 for ease
of notation. As for the variance, it can be approximated following [9] as follows:
√
Vary˜
([
a>2 (max (y˜,0) + b2)
))
≈ √
6pi
(
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
ai2a
j
2Ψi,j
(
Hi,j cos−1(−Hi,j) +
√
1−H2i,j
)
−
(
a>2
√
diag(A1AT1 )
)2) 12
.
Note that for ease of notationHi,j = A1(i,:)
>A1(j,:)
‖A1(i,:)‖2‖A1(j,:)‖2 and thatHi,i = 1. Thus, we have that
UM −Uapprox
≈ a>2 M (A1x+ b1) + b2 + |a>2 MA1|1− a>2 [µy˜  Φ(µy˜  σy˜))− σy˜  φ(µy˜  σy˜)]
− b2 − m√
6pi
(
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
ai2a
j
2Ψi,j
(
Hi,j cos−1(−Hi,j) +
√
1−H2i,j
)
−
(
a>2
√
diag(A1A>1 )
)2) 12
By conditioning over A1, we have
4See the supplementary material for the proof of the Lyapunov condition.
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Ea2
[
UM −Uapprox
]
= Ea2
[
|a>2 MA1|1
]
− m√
6pi
Ea2
[
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
ai2a
j
2Ψi,j
(
Hi,j cos−1(−Hi,j)
+
√
1−H2i,j
)
−
(
a>2
√
diag(A1AT1 )
)2] 12
≥ E
[
|a>2 MA1|1
]
− m√
6pi
[
n∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
Ea2 [ai2ak2 ]Ψi,k
(
Hi,k cos−1(−Hi,k)
+
√
1−H2i,k
)
− Ea2
[(
a>2
√
diag(A1AT1 )
)2]] 12
=  Ea2
[
|a>2 MA1|1
]
− m√
6pi
(
piσ2a2
k∑
i=j
Ψi,j − σ2a2‖A‖2F
) 1
2
= 
n∑
j=1
E
[|a>2 MA1(:, j)|]− mσa2√pi − 1√
6pi
‖A1‖F
= 
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
√
var(a>2 MA1(:, j))−
mσa2
√
pi − 1√
6pi
‖A1‖F
= σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
√
A1(:, j)
T
MA1(:, j)− mσa2
√
pi − 1√
6pi
‖A1‖F
= σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
√√√√ k∑
i=1
A1(i, j)
2
M(i, i)− mσa2
√
pi − 1√
6pi
‖A1‖F
= σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
√√√√ k∑
i=1
A1(i, j)
2
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}− mσa2√pi − 1√
6pi
‖A1‖F
The second equality follows from that ai2 ∀i are independent random variables. The first inequality
follows by Jenson’s where the forth inequality follows from the mean of a folded Gaussian. Lastly,
by taking the expectation over A1 where S is the set of indices where ui1 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S. Since u1
is random, then |S| is also random. Therefore, one can reparametrize the sum and thus we have
EA1,a2,|S|
[
UM −Uapprox
]
= E|S|
[
EA1
[
σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
√∑
i∈S
A1(i, j)
2
− mσA2
√
pi − 1√
6pi
√√√√ n∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
A1(i, j)
2
∣∣∣∣|S|] ]
= E|S|
[
2σa2σA1n√
pi
Γ
( |S|+1
2
)
Γ
( |S|
2
) − mσa2σA1√pi − 1√
3pi
Γ
(
nk+1
2
)
Γ
(
nk
2
) ]
≈ 2σa2σA1n√
pi
E|S|
[√
|S|
2
]
− mσa2σA1
√
pi − 1√
3pi
√
nk
2
The second equality follows as a special case of Lemma 1. That is, if we have that
E
[√
|S|
]
√
k
≥ m
√
pi−1√
12n
.
The last approximation follows from stirlings formula Γ(x+1/2)/Γ(x/2) ≈ √x/2 for large x. Since
E
[√|S|] ≤ √k, then as the input dimension increases, i.e. (n→∞) the theorem follows.
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B Tightness Compared to Layerwise Propagation
Theorem 2. (Probabilistically Tighter Bounds in Expectation) Consider an `∞ bounded uni-
form random variable input x˜, i.e. x˜ ∈ [x− 1n,x+ 1n], to a block of layers in the form of
Affine-ReLU-Affine (parameterized by A1,b1,a2 and b2 for the first and second affine layers re-
spectively) and a2 ∼ N (0, σa2I). Under the assumption that 1√2pixj1>kA1(:, j) + 12n1>k b1 ≥

(
‖A1(:, j)‖2 − 1√2pi‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
∀j, we have: Ea2 [(UIBP − LIBP)− (UM − LM)] ≥ 0.
Proof. Note that
[(UIBP − LIBP)− (UM − LM)] = |a>2 ||A1|1n +
1
2
|a>2 ||u1| −
1
2
|a>2 ||l1|
− 2|
∣∣∣a>2 diag (1 {u1 ≥ 0})A1|∣∣∣1n
Consider the coordinate splitting functions S++(.), S+−(.), S−−(.) and S−+(.) such that for x ∈ Rn
S++(x) = x 1{ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≥ 0} where 1{ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≥ 0} is a vector of all zeros and 1 in the
locations where both ui1, l
i
1 ≥ 0. However, since u1 ≥ l1, then S−+(.) = 0. Therefore it is clear
that for any vector x and an interval [l1,u1], we have that
x = S++ (x) + S+− (x) + S−− (x) , (9)
since the sets {i;ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≥ 0}, {i;ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≤ 0} and {i;ui1 ≤ 0, li1 ≤ 0} are disjoints and
their union {i = 1, i = 2, . . . , i = k}. We will denote the difference in the interval lengths as
WIBP −WM for ease of notation. Thus, we have the following:
WIBP −WM = S++
(|a>2 |) |A1|1n + S+− (|a>2 |) |A1|1n + S−− (|a>2 |) |A1|1n + 12S++ (|a>2 |) |u1|
+
1
2
S+−
(|a>2 |) |u1|+ 12S−− (|a>2 |) |u1| − 12S++ (|a>2 |) |l1| − 12S+− (|a>2 |) |l1|
− 1
2
S−−
(|a>2 |) |l1| − 2
∣∣∣∣∣ (S++ (a>2 )+ S+− (a>2 )+ S−− (a>2 )) diag (1 {u1 ≥ 0})
∣∣∣∣∣1n
= 2S++
(|a>2 |) |A1|1n + S+− (|a>2 |) (A1x+ b1) + S+− (|a>2 |)A11n
− 2
∣∣∣∣∣ (S++ (a>2 )+ S+− (a>2 ))A1
∣∣∣∣∣1n
= 2S++
(|a>2 |) |A1|1n︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬
+S+−
(|a>2 |)u1︸ ︷︷ ︸
­
− 2
∣∣∣∣∣ (S++ (a>2 )+ S+− (a>2 ))A1
∣∣∣∣∣1n︸ ︷︷ ︸
®
.
Note that we used the property of the coordinate splitting functions defined in Eq 9 along with the
definitions of The previous The penultimate equality follows since S++(.) and S+−(.) corresponds
to the indices that are selected by l1 and u1. The penultimate equality follows since S++ and S+−
corresponds to the indices that are selected by diag (1 {u1 ≥ 0}).
Now by taking the expectation over a2, we have for ¬ :
2E
[
S++
(|a>2 ||A1|)]1n = 2 k∑
i=1
E
[|ai2|] |A1(i, :)|1{ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≥ 0}1n
= 2σa2
√
2
pi
k∑
i=1
|A1(i, :)|1
{
li1 ≥ 0
}
1n
= 2σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
|A1(i, j)|1
{
li1 ≥ 0
}
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The second equality follows from the mean of the folded Gaussian. and the fact that u1 ≥ l1.
For ­ , we have:
E
[
S+−
(|a>2 |)u1] = σa2√ 2pi
k∑
i=1
ui11
{
ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≤ 0
}
Lastly, for ® , we have:
2E
[∣∣∣∣∣ (S++ (a>2 )+ S+− (a>2 ))A1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
1n = 2E
∣∣∣∣∣
[
k∑
i=1
A1(i, :)a
i
2
(
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
})] ∣∣∣∣∣1n
Using Holder’s inequality, i.e. E[|x|] ≤ √E[x2], per coordinate of the vector[∑k
i=1A1(i, :)a
i
2
(
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
})]
and by binomial expansion, we have at the jth coordinate
2
√√√√E[ k∑
i=1
A1(i, j)ai21
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}]2
= 2
(
k∑
i=1
(A1(i, j))
2 E
[(
ai2
)2]
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}
+ 2
∑
i=1
∑
z<i
A1(i, j)A1(z, j)E
[
ai2a
z
2
]
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}
1 {uz1 ≥ 0}
) 1
2
= 2
√√√√ k∑
i=1
(A1(i, j))
2 E
[(
ai2
)2]
1
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}
= 2σa2
√√√√ k∑
i=1
(A(i, j))
2
1 {ui ≥ 0}
The second equality follows from by the independence of ai2 and that they have zero mean. Therefore
it follows from ® that:
2E
[∣∣∣∣∣ (S++ (A>2 )+ S+− (A>2 ))A1
∣∣∣∣∣
]
1n ≤ 2σa2
n∑
j=1
√√√√ k∑
i=1
(A1(i, j))
2
1 {ui ≥ 0}
Lastly, putting things together, i.e. E [¬ +­ −® ] we have that
E [WIBP −WM ] ≥ 2σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
|A1(i, j)|1
{
li1 ≥ 0
}
+ σa2
√
2
pi
k∑
i=1
ui11
{
ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≤ 0
}
− 2σa2
n∑
j=1
√√√√ k∑
i=1
A1(i, j)21
{
ui1 ≥ 0
}
.
(10)
Note that to show that the previous inequality is non-negative, it is sufficient to show that the previous
inequality is non-negative for the non-intersecting sets {i : li1 ≥ 0} and {i : ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≤ 0}. Thus
the right hand side can be written as the sum of two sets.
For the set {i : li1 ≥ 0}, the RHS of inequality 10 reduces to
2σa2
n∑
j=1
(√
2
pi
‖A1(:, j)‖1 − ‖A1(:, j)‖2
)
. (11)
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For the set {i : ui1 ≥ 0, li1 ≤ 0} and using the definition of u1, the RHS of inequality 10 reduces to
σa2
√
2
pi
k∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
A1(i, j)xj + bi + 
n∑
j=1
|A1(i, j)|
− 2σa2 n∑
j=1
‖A1(:, j)‖2
= σa2
√
2
pi
n∑
j=1
(
xj1
>
kA1(:, j) +
1
n
1>k b+ ‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
− 2σa2
n∑
j
‖A1(:, j)‖2
=
n∑
j=1
(
σa2
√
2
pi
(
xj1
>
kA1(:, j) +
1
n
1>k b+ ‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
− 2σa2‖A1(:, j)‖2
)
(12)
Note that given the assumption in the Theorem where 1√
2pi
xj1
>
kA1(:, j) +
1
2n1
>
k b ≥ 0 ≥

(
‖A1(:, j)‖2 − 1√2pi‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
∀j, then if both Eq 11 and Eq 12 are non-negative complet-
ing the proof.
Lemma 1. For x ∈ Rk ∼ N (0, I), where k ≥ 5 we have that E
[
3√
2pi
‖x‖1 − 2‖x‖2
]
≥ 0.
Proof. Note that by the mean of a folded Gaussian, we gave that E [‖x‖1] =
∑k
i E [|xi|] = k
√
2
pi .
Moreover, note that
E [‖x‖2] = E

√√√√ k∑
i
x2i
 = E [√y] = 1
2
k
2−1Γ(k2 )
∫ ∞
0
xk exp
(
−x
2
2
)
dx =
2
k−1
2 Γ
(
k+1
2
)
2
k
2−1Γ(k2 )
=
√
2
Γ
(
k+1
2
)
Γ(k2 )
∼
√
k.
Note that y is Chi-Square random variable and that f√y(x) = 2xfy(x2) = x
k−1
2
k
2
−1Γ( k2 )
exp
(
−x22
)
where the third inequality follows by integrating by parts recursively. Lastly, the last approximation
follows by stirling’s approximation for large k.
Proposition 2. For a random matrix A1 ∈ Rk×n with i.i.d elements such A1(i, j) ∼ N (0, 1), then
EA1
(
‖A1(:, j)‖2 − 1√
2pi
‖A1(:, j)‖1
)
=
√
2
Γ
(
k+1
2
)
Γ
(
k
2
) − k√ 2
pi
≈
√
k
(
1−
√
2
pi
√
k
)
.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 1.
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C More Qualitative Results of the New Bounds
We conduct several more experiments to showcase the tightness of our proposed bounds to the
true bounds and compared them against propagating the bounds layerwise [lDM,uDM] for random
n− 100− 100− 100− 100− 2 networks initialized withN (0, 1/√n) similar to [11]. We show our
bounds compared to the polytobe estimated from MonteCarlo sampling on results for n ∈ {2, 10, 20}
and  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25}. The layer wise bound propagation is shown in the tables as the bounds
were too loose to be presented visually.
Figure 7: Each row represents 5 different randomly initialized networks for a given  with n = 2.
Note that the proposed bounds are far from being true this is as predicted by Theorem 1 for small n.
, Figure Number l1DM u
1
DM l
2
DM u
2
DM
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 1 -10.1261 19.0773 -18.1500 13.3573
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 2 -12.2529 14.3428 -14.4295 12.3479
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 3 -12.6594 14.1837 -12.5873 12.2612
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 4 -17.7825 16.4048 -15.3843 15.1688
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 5 -12.5260 11.1149 -8.9242 12.7539
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 1 -27.4598 23.6603 -17.9481 23.4817
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 2 -23.2877 34.0542 -28.1535 21.8703
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 3 -35.2950 36.4901 -31.7465 36.0421
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 4 -31.7154 29.3062 -30.3900 35.7105
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 5 -25.0870 39.4373 -24.5087 32.5493
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 1 -54.0557 56.2884 -52.5686 73.9621
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 2 -59.2115 82.8742 -75.7999 65.6898
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 3 -50.1142 56.2330 -72.4221 54.4631
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 4 -52.6030 83.3950 -92.8100 69.1401
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 5 -89.1335 43.4685 -74.4519 91.5137
Table 1: Shows the interval bounds obtained by propagating  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25} with n = 2 and
denoted as l1DM, u
1
DM for the first output function of the 2-dimensional output network (shown along
the x-axis in the previous figure) while l2DM and u
2
DM is for the other function (shown along the y-axis
in the previous figure).
17
Figure 8: Each row represents 5 different randomly initialized networks for a given  with n = 10.
Note how the bounds are more likely now to enclose the true output region for all given  compared
to previous case where n = 2.
, Figure Number l1DM u
1
DM l
2
DM u
2
DM
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 1 -16.9716 24.9259 -21.2584 20.6358
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 2 -42.6267 48.1786 -38.6958 37.7851
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 3 -41.4147 36.4056 -42.0363 36.6605
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 4 -32.1013 25.1485 -37.7864 33.3652
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 5 -45.4368 32.9774 -44.8946 38.6805
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 1 -48.1221 86.6800 -54.3059 71.2724
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 2 -51.2668 46.1237 -38.8089 33.6512
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 3 -51.3915 52.4437 -52.7149 49.1031
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 4 -71.7738 54.4836 -91.0335 37.0950
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 5 -48.1744 33.2927 -40.9540 47.2282
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 1 -152.7639 192.4156 -188.4030 148.2482
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 2 -196.8923 195.4355 -163.2691 177.3766
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 3 -141.6800 207.5414 -207.9396 190.2823
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 4 -200.7513 156.2560 -227.6427 182.0180
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 5 -153.3898 164.8314 -147.8662 137.4380
Table 2: Shows the interval bounds obtained by propagating  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25} with n = 10 and
denoted as l1DM, u
1
DM for the first output function of the 2-dimensional output network (shown along
the x-axis in the previous figure) while l2DM and u
2
DM is for the other function (shown along the y-axis
in the previous figure).
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Figure 9: Each row represents 5 different randomly initialized networks for a given  with n = 20.
The bounds almost always enclose the polytope computed from Monte-Carlo compared to n = 2, 10.
, Figure Number l1DM u
1
DM l
2
DM u
2
DM
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 1 -43.6689 32.8572 -47.7856 36.9842
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 2 -53.2447 47.1651 -46.5306 53.1638
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 3 -59.1694 42.6647 -43.4659 57.2781
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 4 -39.8479 42.4197 -42.1962 39.7649
 = 0.05, Figure Number = 5 -54.3150 42.8637 -44.5742 43.8117
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 1 -83.5804 81.9034 -97.5203 98.8713
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 2 -64.8464 76.8083 -84.9223 83.9505
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 3 -70.5862 92.6652 -88.6098 71.8915
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 4 -78.0557 151.4360 -106.073 123.3686
 = 0.1, Figure Number = 5 -91.8368 97.3438 -103.2845 76.6581
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 1 -188.7623 256.2275 -211.3972 255.5101
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 2 -219.5642 274.5287 -217.7622 349.4256
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 3 -214.7457 160.7498 -186.5554 184.1767
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 4 -188.7623 256.2275 -211.3972 255.5101
 = 0.25, Figure Number = 5 -276.9137 177.7929 -202.2031 245.8731
Table 3: Shows the interval bounds obtained by propagating  ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.25} with n = 20 and
denoted as l1DM, u
1
DM for the first output function of the 2-dimensional output network (shown along
the x-axis in the previous figure) while l2DM and u
2
DM is for the other function (shown along the y-axis
in the previous figure).
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D Experimental Setup for Training DNNs
small medium large
CONV 16× 4× 4 + 2 CONV 32× 3× 3 + 1 CONV 64× 3× 3 + 1
CONV 32× 4× 4 + 1 CONV 32× 4× 4 + 2 CONV 64× 3× 3 + 1
FC 100 CONV 64× 3× 3 + 1 CONV 128× 3× 3 + 2
CONV 64× 4× 4 + 2 CONV 128× 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 CONV 128× 3× 3 + 1
FC 512 FC 200
Table 4: Architectures for the three models trained on MNIST and CIFAR10. "CONV p×w×h+s",
correspond to p 2D convolutional filters with size (w × h) and strides of s. While "FC d" is a fully
connected layer with d outputs. Note that the last fully connected layer is omitted.
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E PGD Robustness on Specific Input Bounds on MNIST
Figure 10: Compares PGD (test = 0.1) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on MNIST.
Figure 11: Compares PGD (test = 0.2) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on MNIST.
Figure 12: Compares PGD (test = 0.3) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on MNIST.
Figure 13: Compares PGD (test = 0.4) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on MNIST.
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F PGD Robustness on Specific Input Bounds on CIFAR10
Figure 14: Compares PGD (test = 2/255) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on CIFAR10.
Figure 15: Compares PGD (test = 8/255) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on CIFAR10.
Figure 16: Compares PGD (test = 16/255) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on CIFAR10.
Figure 17: Compares PGD (test = 0.1) and test accuracy of our models against IBP on CIFAR10.
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